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1. BACKGROUND
ENSERCH Corp. is a diversified energy, engineering and con-
struction company headquartered in Dallas, Texas. Through our vari-
ous subsidiary companies, we presently do business in sixty-five foreign
countries. With the exception of our oil and gas exploration activities,
we normally do not take any equity position in any overseas product.
Yet this fact neither reduces nor eliminates the kinds of risks we are
addressing this afternoon.
A considerable portion of my time is spent in risk-avoidance, that
is, helping senior management identify risks sufficiently in advance so
that appropriate protective action may be taken. Contract language or
risk insurance may provide such protection in some cases, but in others
it may be possible only to monitor risk. In the extreme cases, risk may
be judged too high, and we will abandon an opportunity.
The Iranian revolution' gave impetus to the profession of political
risk analysis for a number of multinational corporations. The revolu-
tion caught ENSERCH Corp., and a number of other multinationals,
by surprise. While we had been performing political risk analysis prior
to the revolution, we, like a number of other firms, might have called it
something else.
We initiated a more formalized approach to political risk analysis
in response to Iran. We also broadened our approach and, when evalu-
ating new prospects or expanding opportunities for management, began
to examine not only political risk, but financial and commercial risk as
well. Moreover, we went beyond the limits of normal political risk
analysis by attaching appropriate weight to those risks unique to EN-
SERCH because we are a U.S. company. Our list of risks unique to
U.S. firms includes the following:
1) the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA);
2
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2) boycotts, especially the Anti-Arab Boycott;'
3) the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws;
4) the act of state doctrine;4
5) U.S. human rights policy;
6) U.S. anti-terrorism policy;
7) export controls;
8) economic sanctions; and
9) the linkage between trade and politics.
We would also add to this list the more intangible risk deriving from
the historic inconsistencies of U.S. foreign policy.
We accord these kinds of risks as much weight as we would ac-
cord, for example, leadership succession crises. I would emphasize that
senior management is not to arrive at a decision regarding a proposed
opportunity unless and until a country risk analysis is completed and
given the same consideration as the project economic analysis.
Country risk analysis is strictly subjective, and there is no alterna-
tive. We deal in informed judgment, however, and an acceptable degree
of confidence in our process has emerged over time.
Our effort to assess risk normally culminates in a relatively
brief-usually about ten pages-final report that identifies the key
risks, discusses each risk in limited detail, and recommends a protective
course of action for each risk. A simplified matrix expresses in terms of
degree of risk our summary evaluation of the country as a place to do
business. We do not, however, advise senior management to avoid coun-
try A and instead look for business in country B; that is not the pur-
pose of the exercise. Our purpose is to make a judgment about a partic-
ular project to be carried out by a particular subsidiary in a particular
country. We do not go beyond those parameters.
As time has passed, we found that the manager in the field, who
watches the daily bottom line, was less concerned about political risk
than we previously had thought. We began to understand that our
managers would appreciate accurate forecasts of possible devaluations
or changes in currency controls. In response, we established a separate
financial risk assessment program which has allowed us to give more
attention to risks such as delays in payment, devaluation, and inability
I See NAT'L J., June 18, 1977, at 962. In 1976, the United States passed legisla-
tion prohibiting U.S. cooperation with the Arab boycott of companies that do business
with Israel. Id.
" "The act of state doctrine precludes the courts of this country from inquiring
into the validity of governmental acts of a recognized foreign sovereign committed
within its own territory." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 32 (5th ed. 1979). See also, e.g.,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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to convert and repatriate.
This program provides for tracking six financial risk indicators,
including debt service ratios, the reserves-to-imports ratio, currency
competitiveness, and import incompressibility. We have a computer
data base that dates back eleven years for each of the six financial risk
indicators; to the extent possible we use the same information the host
country employs when it makes financial decisions. Interpreting com-
puter-generated trend charts allows us to make respectable judgments
on financial risk. We conduct postmortems annually to see how well we
are doing, and our level of success is quite high. Eighty-five percent of
the devaluation forecasts over a twelve-month period for a total of
twenty-six countries were within fifteen percent of the actual
devaluation.
2. CODES OF CONDUCT
With this analysis as a general background, let me now turn to the
issue of sanctions, export controls, boycotts, foreign payments and other
constraints that, taken together, form a code of conduct for the multina-
tional. My intention is to briefly describe how one multina-
tional-ENSERCH Corp.-attempts to accommodate itself to this
body of laws, regulations, and policies that clearly affect the conduct of
business abroad.
How do we feel about these laws, regulations, and policies? Let
me put it this way: We do not make foreign policy, we only implement
it. We must be prepared to make sacrifices-in the form of lost mar-
kets-in support of policies in which we may or may not believe. In the
collective mind of the United States Department of State, foreign policy
interests have to supercede the rights of private enterprise.
Certain of these constraints, in particular the FCPA5 and the Arab
Boycott,' are clearly set forth in the law, and they should not surprise
the well-prepared multinational. Other risks and disincentives, such as
economic sanctions, reflect governmental policies which change in re-
sponse to the political realities of the day.
2.1. International Boycotts
ENSERCH Corp. has developed very specific guidelines for our
employees on how to respond to international boycotts. Moreover, we
conduct an ongoing program to ensure that employees are kept current
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1988).
6 See supra note 3.
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on anti-boycott developments.
The process begins with our Statement of Proce-
dure-International Boycotts. Personnel turnover mandates that this
Statement be circulated regularly, and it is up to local management to
ensure that all those who have any involvement with trade, transporta-
tion, or finance related to any boycotting country read and sign the
Statement.
To facilitate coordination of activities, each subsidiary company
has a designated International Boycott Coordinator. ENSERCH corpo-
rate staff work with these coordinators, who are then responsible for
getting out the message in their own areas. Our corporate staff updates
the coordinators concerning boycott developments on an annual basis.
Where do the major problems arise? Here are some of the difficult
areas:
1) communicating messages to the last individual in the link,
for example, the shipping clerk who completes the required
daily statements or certifications made in connection with
any company transactions, and making certain that he or she
understands the rules of the game;
2) addressing the concerns of foreign subsidiaries who feel
unjustly constrained by having to comply with U.S. laws;
3) encountering individuals in the boycotting countries them-
selves intent on pursuing every letter of the boycott
regulations;
4) having companies provide the boycotting countries with
more information than they require and, in so doing, con-
flicting with U.S. law; and
5) addressing disparities between what the boycotting manu-
als may say and what the boycotting countries may accept in
practice.
We have found that working with our foreign subsidiaries on the
matter of boycotts has been perhaps the most difficult issue for us.
2.2. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Our procedures to ensure strict adherence to the FCPA7 operate in
The FCPA amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
7811 (1988) (current version), to make it unlawful for those issuers covered by the Se-
curities Exchange Act "to make certain payments to foreign officials and other foreign
persons, to require such issuers to maintain accurate records, and for other purposes."
FCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-213, preamble, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (statute codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1988)). Violations of the Securities Exchange
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very much the same way as our procedures concerning boycotts, al-
though the internal audit is probably more strict regarding accuracy of
compliance. Financial accounts are very closely scrutinized.
If a subsidiary is wholly-owned or controlled in fact, subsidiary
employees are incorporated into our adherence procedures. If a subsidi-
ary is not controlled in fact, we apply the "dog gets one bite" rule. If
we find that someone has misbehaved regarding foreign payments, we
stop any dealing with him or her, for it is likely that he or she will
misbehave again. When we purchased the assets of a foreign corpora-
tion in the 1970s, we discovered that one does not "buy" past viola-
tions. The problem in this transaction was to educate the new people
who were slow-or reluctant-to respond. Violations were discovered
by our auditors, and we had to go to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC).
The problem lies in divergent corporate cultures. The culture at
ENSERCH Corp. is very conservative and risk-averse, while the cor-
porate culture of our subsidiaries was developed in the Middle East, a
foreign environment where, in the early days of the oil industry in par-
ticular, a premium was placed on initiative, imagination, and innova-
tion. The people in these industries were most certainly not of the "es-
tablishment," but they were the kind of people firms trying to get a
business established would want at their disposal. This exemplary en-
trepreneurship had to be contained and made to conform.
For most multinationals, foreign agents who play a role in seeking
out and securing new business represent a vulnerability as well as an
asset. Consultants are also subject to background investigations. We
often employ the resources of the Washington office in these
investigations.
Background checks that are inadequate due to time and money
constraints are an ever-present source of discomfort. We often find our-
selves asking, "What have we missed?" Background checks conducted
by the White House are the source of some comfort, although they
often miss something in a political appointee's background that may
subsequently prove embarrassing. This is true even though the White
House has considerable facilities at its disposal.
Finally, we look to local legal counsel to provide guidance to our
local operations and to ensure that host country exchange controls are
observed.
Through our written procedures we make a particular effort to
Act are reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d,
78f.
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explain, to the required degree of detail, what constitutes permissible
and impermissible behavior. The categories of behavior we seek to eval-
uate include gratuities; tips and facilitating payments; social amenities;
and gifts and entertainment.
Under the FCPA, two questions remain despite the clear criminal-
ity of bribing foreign government officials: "What constitutes bribery?"
and "Who is a government official? ' '" I would like just to address the
latter question.
The question "Who is a government official?" is not academic at
all.9 Not long ago, a U.S.-based, medium-sized, international oil com-
pany faced the problem of trying to confirm that an individual who
received sizeable fees was a private businessman, not a government offi-
cial.10 The payments had been made generally for assistance in secur-
ing supplies of crude oil at a time when such supplies were tight. Well-
placed U.S. individuals outside the transactions at issue opined that
Mr. Y would probably be regarded as a foreign government official for
FCPA purposes."i Another outside source believed that Mr. Y was a
government official because the so-called "Blue Book"12 listed Mr. Y as
his embassy's Counsellor for Political Affairs. Yet another legal source
found that there were no violations of the FCPA.13
Does possession of a diplomatic passport and a car with diplomatic
tags, and a listing in the Blue Book, make one a government official? Is
one a government official even if these privileges are provided to a citi-
zen by his government merely as a courtesy to help with individual
business dealings?
8 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (1988).
8 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act defines a foreign official as anyone who acts
in an official capacity for or on behalf of a foreign government. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
1(0(1).
'0 See in particular a series of articles in the Washington Post on the questionable
payments made by Orin E. Atkins, the chairman and chief executive officer of Ashland
Oil Co., to-among others-consultants who were close to the Sultan of Oman and
may have been foreign officials. Mintz, Scarce Oil, Disputed Deals-and a Corporate
Revolt (pt. 1), Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1987, at HI, Ashland Oil: The Middle East Con-
nection (pts. 2 & 3), Aug. 16, 1987, at H1, Aug. 23, 1987, at Hi. Also see the report
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission by Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, John-
son & Hutchison, the law firm retained by Ashland Oil to conduct an independent
investigation into the matter (May 19, 1983) (SEC File No. 1-2918).
1' See sources cited supra note 10.
12 The "Blue Book" is the common name for the State Department publication
containing the names of the members of the diplomatic staffs of all missions and their
spouses. The list is revised quarterly. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC
LIsT (Nov. 1987).
13 See sources cited supra note 10.
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2.3. Export Controls
As we are often painfully aware, the United States controls export
goods and technology for reasons of national security, foreign policy,
and shortage of supply. 4 Export controls rarely affect ENSERCH
Corp., and when they do, it is usually for reasons of foreign policy or
national security. We are almost never affected because of short domes-
tic supply.
By their nature export controls are highly controversial. 5 United
States policymakers seem to have the misguided impression, which in
the view of some Europeans borders on arrogance, that the United
States is the sole repository of technological innovation. 6 I do not be-
lieve the United States is arrogant. If Americans are guilty of anything,
it is that we consistently underrate the abilities of other nations to get
things done.
The U.S. business community has been heavily impacted by the
imposition and extension of export controls that do not adequately ac-
count for, among other things, the adverse effects on the export per-
formance of the United States, the reputation of the United States as a
reliable supplier, and the impact of export controls on U.S. exporting
companies and their employees.
The General Accounting Office's report to Congress in August
1986 underscored that the purpose of foreign policy-based export con-
trols is simply to demonstrate U.S. opposition to the policies of other
countries and that, while these controls impose few-if any-costs on
target countries, they impose costs on U.S. business.'" The politician
with good intentions may value symbolism, but symbolism does not
help meet payrolls. Nor does it support the competitiveness of the
United States.
I must also add at this point that the U.S. business community
deeply resents any inference that selling to the U.S.S.R. represents
nothing more than greed taking priority over concern for the national
security of our country. We live in a world that is becoming increas-
ingly interdependent. If in the 1990s competition for buying power re-
14 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399 (1980) (to be trans-
ferred as amended to 15 C.F.R. ch. 7).
" See Export Controls, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 11, 1989, at 75.
1" See, e.g., Jones, California Graphite Fights for Prepreg Exports, METAL-
WORKING NEWS, Oct. 30, 1989, at 30 (U.S. company protests export controls that
prevent complaining company from selling its machine to Eastern bloc countries, while
foreign competitors are already doing so); Goldbaum, More Curbs on Weapons Precur-
sors, CHEMICAL WEEK, Oct. 18, 1989, at 22.
17 GEN. AccT. OFF., EXPORT CONTROLS, ASSESSMENT OF COMMERCE DEPART-
MENT'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT TO CONGRESS (1986).
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places the Cold War rhetoric of competition for human minds,"8 will
we be able to maintain our world position without grasping the impli-
cations of the transition from an innovative society to a services-oriented
society?
2.4. Economic Sanctions
Economic sanctions have come to play a major role in the conduct
of U.S. foreign policy. American readiness to link trade and politics,
and to use trade as reward or punishment, clearly distinguishes the
United States from other industrialized countries; the majority of these
other countries are reluctant to make that link.
Our government views economic sanctions as an integral part of
peaceful measures that can be taken to deter states from supporting
terrorism, from abrogating human rights, or from conducting acts of
military aggression. Some nations, such as Libya, Cuba, Iran, and
South Yemen, are longstanding targets of economic sanctions. Others,
including the Soviet Union and Poland, are intermittent targets, de-
pending on whether our relations happen to be blowing hot or cold.19
Still others, such as South Africa, Nicaragua, and Panama, are
newcomers.
A ban on virtually all trade and financial transactions with Libya
was imposed at the beginning of 1986 because of Libya's continuing
link with and support of terrorist activities.2" It is highly questionable
whether the withdrawal of U.S. oil companies from Libya has engen-
dered any particular change on Libya's part. Libya's current financial
difficulties reflect almost entirely the decline in the world price of oil,
not actions taken by the United States.
Earlier in this symposium we heard about the use of Section 232
of the Trade Expansion Act of 196221 to demonstrate that rising oil
imports threatened to impair our national security.22 The fear that oil
18 Recent political developments in Eastern Europe may open a whole new mar-
ket for U.S. business. See Jaffe, Wall of Opportunity?, FORBES, Jan. 22, 1990, at 156;
East Bloc Incomes Could Double by 2000, Economists Say, Reuters Business Report,
Jan. 17, 1990.
19 But see sources cited supra note 19.
20 On January 7, 1986, President Reagan announced the imposition of U.S. eco-
nomic sanctions against Libya and ordered all Americans in Libya to leave the country.
The next .day, he froze all Libyan assets in the United States. These actions were taken
in response to alleged Libyan support of terrorist actions. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1986, at
1, col. 6.
2= 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1982 (1988).
22 See Bialos, Oil Imports and National Security: The Legal and Policy Frame-
work for Ensuring United States Access to Strategic Resource, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus.
L. 235 (1989).
[Vol. 11:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol11/iss2/8
POLITICS BEFORE BUSINESS
exports to the United States might be cut off for political or economic
reasons is real, and justified by the past actions of certain suppliers. Oil
sales have never been stopped simply because sellers ran out of oil.
Oil, like food, is quite correctly viewed as a strategic commodity
whose continuous supply is regarded as absolutely essential to almost
any nation's well-being. The United States may be an oil importer, but
historically it has been a grain exporter. Importing countries have come
to depend upon the United States as a supply source, but we have cut
off these supplies when it has served U.S. national interests. For exam-
ple, the United States has abruptly halted all soybean sales to Japan.
The soybean is basic to the Japanese diet, and over the years Japan
had become heavily dependent upon the United States as a supplier.
Without warning, the United States in 1973 instituted an embargo be-
cause of domestic crop shortages.2" A better-known example is our will-
ingness to reward the U.S.S.R. with access to our corn and wheat for
perceived good behavior, or to withhold deliveries as a form of punish-
ment.2 Should we then be surprised and angry when nations that have
no other weapons at their disposal withhold a commodity-such as
oil-from our market when they deem our actions unacceptable?
The ban on U.S. oil imports from Libya has been essentially
meaningless, since the oil has simply gone to other markets.25 This fact
did not, however, keep the administration from imposing a ban on the
import of oil from Iran. Iranian oil imports were banned by an Execu-
tive Order, issued October 29, 1987, specifically restricting Iranian oil
from entering the U.S. mainland, U.S. territories, and U.S. possessions
such as the Virgin Islands.2" The United States imposed the embargo
because of continued Iranian military aggression in the Persian Gulf.
The volume of Iranian oil exports to the United States surprised
the Administration. Imports had averaged approximately 250,000 bar-
22 N.Y. Times, June 28, 1973, at 1, col. 3.
24 On January 4, 1980, President Carter decided to withhold 17 million tons of
grain ordered by the Soviet Union. See Morgan, Carter Decision on Grain Sure to
Affect the Soviet Diet, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1980, at A6. For a discussion of the eco-
nomic and political effects of the embargo, see Who's Hurt Most by Grain Embargo?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 21, 1980, at 31.
2 The United States decided on March 10, 1982, to prohibit imports of Libyan
oil and to ban exports of oil and gas technology to Libya. The State Department ex-
plained that the restrictions had been imposed because of "a continuing pattern of Lib-
yan activity which violates accepted international norms of behavior." Anderson, U.S.
Cuts Off Aid to Libya Restricts Trade, UPI Press Release, Mar. 10, 1982 (Wash.
News). For a discussion of why the ban would be ineffective against Libya without
cooperation, see Platt's Oilgram News, June 6, 1986, at 2 (U.S.).
26 Exec. Order No. 12,613, 3 C.F.R. § 256 (1987), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. §
1701 (West Supp. 1989).
27 Id.
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rels per day in the first seven months of 1987, including 620,000 bar-
rels per day in July alone. This amount represented an increase from
an average of 190,000 barrels per day for 1986.2 The growth in Ira-
nian oil imports doubtless reflected discounting by Iran in an effort to
move as much crude as possible. Iran needed revenues with which to
carry on the war with Iraq and was selling in a crude-surplus market.
Former Secretary of Energy John S. Herrington noted at the time
the embargo on Iranian oil went into effect, however, that unless U.S.
allies cooperated, our sanctions would have little practical effect on
Iran.29 And the necessary cooperation has unfortunately been minimal.
These "feel-good" acts cost nothing in times, such as today, when
crude oil is in worldwide surplus, although they may cause importers to
scramble a bit to line up other suppliers. A real dilemma exists when
the United States places sanctions on oil purchases at a time when sup-
ply and demand are in balance. Few politicians seem willing to forbid
the purchase of a particular crude when such action might lead to
shortages at home or at least a jump in oil prices that would impact the
Northeast and low-income bracket consumers more heavily than others.
3. SOUTH AFRICA
The U.S. multinationals in South Africa have been confronted for
a number of years with demands to comply with the Sullivan Princi-
ples.3" Since 1986, they have also been pressured to comply alterna-
tively with a set of Fair Labor Standards outlined by the U.S. govern-
ment.-" The U.S. multinationals have responded by committing over
$200 million and considerable time to training, community development
programs, and other activities to help improve the future for the black
South African.
28 Platt's Oilgram News, Oct. 28, 1987, at 4 (U.S.).
29 Herrington emphasized that the embargo would be "effective in direct propor-
tion to the cooperation we get from the allies." He stated, "We must have large-scale
participation . . . Without the participation of Japan, West Germany and Italy [the
embargo] won't be effective." Id. See also Kempster, U.S. Urges Allies to Join Iran
Embargo, L.A. Times, Oct. 28, 1987, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
"0 The Sullivan Principles were developed by the Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, a Phila-
delphia minister, in 1978. The Principles are a set of fair employment standards outlin-
ing equality in pay, employment opportunity, and access. See Note, North Carolina
South African Divestment Statute, 67 N.C. L. REV. 949 n.3 (1989). Rev. Sullivan has
since repudiated the Principles. Id. at 949 n.3 (citing Barnaby, Sullivan Asks End of
Business Links with South Africa, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1987, at Al, col. 1). The
Principles are codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5034 (Supp. V 1987).
1 The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. V 1987),
requires covered employers to pay their employees a minimum hourly wage and over-
time compensation.
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Some would have these companies leave South Africa as a way of
showing our displeasure at its slowness in dismantling apartheid. Now,
I ask you, will racial discrimination go away if we go away? Of course
not. Nevertheless, many U.S. multinationals have judged the future in
South Africa to be uninviting and have chosen to disinvest.
Although current economic sanctions have failed to move South
Africa to reduce racial discrimination, there is, as we feared, considera-
ble pressure in Congress to impose new, stricter penalties. It is difficult
for a politician, particularly in an election year, to be seen as not favor-
ing punitive actions against apartheid. At the same time, the Adminis-
tration has indicated that it will veto further sanctions, believing that
they might only make life more difficult for the oppressed and cause
South Africa to harden its stance.
Apartheid is morally wrong and politically unacceptable. But what
about the value of sanctions? One commentator has observed:
The administration is required annually by the 1986 sanc-
tions law . . . to report on its policy towards South Africa.
The general finding has been that the U.S. sanctions against
South Africa were not an effective way to end apartheid, and
that sanctions had not moved South Africa any closer toward
ending racial separations. 2
In the months subsequent to the imposition of sanctions on South
Africa, U.S. companies have stood by and watched others, especially
Japan and West Germany, step in to take advantage of our reduced
presence. Once again, the linkage of trade and politics is working
against the U.S. business community.
4. EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH
Perhaps the most persistent source of tension between the United
States and Europe has been, and continues to be, the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. laws.
The last great battle over extraterritorial reach was fought in the
early 1980s, when the United States extended its embargo on equip-
ment for a Soviet gas pipeline to foreign subsidiaries.33 The immediate
32 U.S. Says Sanctions Don't Harm S[outh] Africa, J. Com., Apr. 13, 1989, at
5A, col. 1.
33 In response to the declaration of martial law in Poland, President Reagan
banned the sale of U.S. technology to the Soviet Union. This embargo was expanded,
in retaliation to continued repression in Poland, on June 18, 1982 to include foreign
subsidiaries and licensees of U.S. firms. Morgan, Pipeline Sanctions Toughened; Rea-
gan Disregards European Allies in Anti-Soviet Move, Wash. Post, June 19, 1982, at
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and highly vocal European reaction 4 emphasized the embargo's unilat-
eral, retroactive, and extraterritorial character.
The failed U.S. attempt to halt construction of the West Siberia-
Europe gas pipeline by utilizing an embargo and applying extraterrito-
rial reach to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies need not be re-
viewed in detail at this point. Suffice it to say that it was an interna-
tional relations and public disaster, even though the United States had
good intentions. (We did not want our friends and allies in Europe to
become overly dependent upon an unreliable supplier.)
While the U.S. sanctions delayed its completion, the pipeline was
built nevertheless. Domestic compressors were installed instead of com-
pressors supplied by foreign manufacturers, and we now find ourselves
considering the implications of inadequate domestic compressors. With-
out proper compression, the gas flow will decline, and deliveries of gas
to Europe may fall behind schedule. Thus, unreliable supply-the very
situation we sought to prevent-may come about because of our well-
intended but misguided policies.
Several years later, the United States instituted tight sanctions on
Libya3 5 but did not attempt to extend these sanctions to include foreign
subsidiaries. The general failure of the gas pipeline embargo and the
degree of European reaction to the embargo probably accounted for the
U.S. strategy vis-A-vis Libya.
ENSERCH had its own encounter with extraterritorial reach in
the very early 1980s, when we attempted to acquire the Davy Corpora-
tion, Great Britain's largest engineering company. The attempted take-
over was quickly referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission,
which recommended against the proposed merger largely because the
Commission objected to the implied extraterritorial reach of U.S.
laws.3 6 It also singled out in particular the Anti-Arab Boycott and the
FCPA 7 The Commission concluded that having to adhere to the anti-
boycott and foreign payment measures would limit the business pros-
Al.
"' See West German Chancellor Discontented with U.S. Extension of Embargo
against Soviet Union, Xinhua General Overseas News Serv., June 25, 1982; New Re-
strictions on Technology Exports Draw Protests, UPI Press Release, June 24, 1982
(Wash. News); Mitterand Angered by Reagan Policies, UPI Press Release, June 23,
1982 (Int'l); Temko, U.S. Curbs on Moscow Jolt Major Allies, Christian Science Mon-
itor, June 22, 1982, at 1; Lewald, West Germany Evaluates Legality of U.S. Moves
against Siberian Pipeline, Platt's Oilgram News, June 20, 1989, at 1 (Int'l); Morgan,
supra note 35, at Al.
3 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
36 MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMM'N, ENSERCH CORPORATION AND
DAVY CORPORATION LIMITED (Sept. 1981) (published in London by Her Majesty's
Stationery Office).
" See supra notes 2-3.
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pects for Davy.
5. THE NEED FOR A CONSISTENT UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY
The multinational finds it very difficult to develop foreign market-
ing strategies when U.S. foreign policy is changing constantly. Recent
examples in Angola, Syria, the Sudan, and Benin come to mind.
5. 1. Angola
Assistant Secretary of State Crocker remarked in early 1986 that
U.S. oil companies should "think about" withdrawing from Angola."
His remarks were probably intended to put pressure on Angola to work
more constructively toward a negotiated peace settlement. They also
doubtless reflected frustration that progress had been too slow. In con-
trast, the Department of State had said eighteen months earlier that
business participation in Angola was in the long-term interests of both
nations.39 But in subsequent months the State Department shifted its
position as a result of the escalation of the war, increased Soviet in-
volvement, and the failure to obtain a negotiated settlement.40
In the summer of 1986, the United States was admonishing U.S.
firms to consider U.S. national interests before committing their re-
sources to Angola.41 And Senator Robert Dole was seeking a trade em-
bargo on Angola as late as the summer of 1987. (The Administration
did not support this initiative because it recognized the significant losses
U.S. companies in Angola would suffer).42
My main point is that the planning and marketing strategies of
multinationals require a reasonable degree of stability if they are to be
implemented successfully. This stability is not limited to foreign mar-
kets, but includes stability-in the form of consistency-in foreign pol-
icy. The bends and U-turns of U.S. foreign policy make for a road map
which often leads multinationals to economic misfortune.
38 See Gwertzman, U.S. Is Urging Chevron to Quit Angola, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29,
1986, at A15, col. 4. Crocker stated that companies operating in Angola "should be
thinking about U.S. national interests as well as their own corporate interests as they
[make] their decisions." Id.
39 Id.
10 Potts, Chevron's Purchase of Gulf Brought Assets and Headaches; Inherited
Angola Holdings Causing Troubles from Right Wing, Wash. Post, May 31, 1987, at
H3.
4' Gwertzman, supra note 38.
42 Potts, supra note 40.
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5.2. Syria
In November 1986, the Department of State informed U.S. oil
companies that it was inappropriate for them to participate in Syria's
oil sector and asked them to voluntarily cease operations in the coun-
try.43 This request resulted from Syria's alleged involvement in terror-
ism and had no force of law. The threat of formal sanctions, however,
remained present. One company complied, 4 but none actually left. In-
deed, during the embargo one U.S. company won a very sizeable con-
tract to develop oil production facilities in Syria.45 It is notable, how-
ever, that the trade sanctions imposed by our government did allow for
contract sanctity and were not extraterritorial in scope. In early Sep-
tember 1987, the Department of State withdrew its ban because of Syr-
ian efforts to distance itself from recognized terrorist groups.46
This calls to mind George Shultz's characterization, made some
time ago, of constantly-changing U.S. foreign policy as "light switch
diplomacy." For Syria, the lights were off for ten months 47 and then
came back on. The oil companies were, thus, faced with a major deci-
sion in November 1986: whether to respond to the interests of the U.S.
government or to protect their investments. The risk existed that Syrian
support of terrorism would deepen. More restrictive sanctions certainly
would follow, as in Libya. All might then be lost. In this instance,
however, those who chose to stick it out were correct.
5.3. The Sudan
Chevron Oil Corporation ordered all non-essential personnel out
of the Sudan in April 1986, because of terrorist activity.48 Sufficient
staff remained behind to continue operations and meet contract commit-
ments. Most of the U.S. embassy staff was also evacuated. The evacua-
tion of dependents and non-essential staff was tempered by the need not
'3 See Platt's Oilgram News, Nov. 17, 1986, at 1 (Int'l).
44 Id.
4' Brown and Root, a U.S. engineering firm, won a $70 million contract to de-
velop two oil fields in Syria. Syrian Oil Field Order Goes to U.S., Financial Times,
Apr. 16, 1987, at 5, col. 3.
48 Greenberger, Oil Companies Are Cleared by U.S. for Syria Business, Wall St.
J., Sept. 14, 1987, at 17, col. 3.
47 Shultz, as president of the Bechtel Corporation, called the U.S. government's
use of foreign trade as a tactical instrument of foreign policy "light switch diplomacy."
He said that the belief that "individual trades can be turned on and off like a light
switch" to induce changes in domestic and foreign policies of another government has
resulted in the erosion of U.S. goods in world markets "as our trading partners increas-
ingly see evidence that we cannot be counted on as a reliable supplier." Shultz, Light-
Switch Diplomacy; Bus. WEEK, May 28, 1979, at 24.
48 See Platt's Oilgram News, Apr. 25, 1986, at 3 (Int'l).
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to appear to be pulling out of the Sudan because of terrorist threats.
Seven months after the evacuation, staffers were allowed to re-
turn.49 Renewal of relations between the United States and the Sudan
was based on signs that the Sudan had distanced itself from Libya.
5.4. Benin
Benin is an even more recent example. A headline in the May 20,
1988, New York Times read as follows: "U.S. Accuses Benin of Abet-
ting Libyan Terrorism. ' 5° Does this mean that we might expect some
kind of sanctions against Benin if the situation worsens? Should I warn
our operations in that country? Would we be well-advised to hold off
on any new commitment until the situation clarifies? Do we stand by
while foreign competition moves in, unimpeded by such considerations?
6. CONCLUSION
The absence of international cooperation continues to impede U.S.
willingness to impose sanctions when jaw-boning fails. Too often we
are out there all alone.
And that brings me to my concluding thought, which is based on a
column that appeared in the Kansas City Times several years ago and
was subsequently expanded into a popular book. It is entitled All I
Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten5 and reads as
follows:
All I really need to know about how to live and what to do
and how to be I learned in kindergarten. Wisdom was not at
the top of the graduate-school mountain, but there in the
sandpile at Sunday School. These are the things I learned:
Share everything.
Play fair.
Don't hit people.
Put things back where you found them.
Clean up your mess.
Don't take things that aren't yours.
Say you're sorry when you hurt somebody.
Wash your hands before you eat.
"'Tyler, U.S.-Sudan Ties Back to Normal, Libya's Influence Diminishes, Evacu-
ated Americans Return Home, Wash. Post, Dec. 2, 1986, at A21.
50 Sciolino, U.S. Accuses Benin of Abetting Libyan Terrorism, N.Y. Times, May
20, 1988, at A3, col. 1.
51 R. FULGHUM, ALL I REALLY NEED To KNOW I LEARNED IN KINDERGARTEN
4-6 (1986).
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Flush.
Warm cookies and cold milk are good for you .
Take a nap every afternoon.
When you go out into the world, watch for traffic, hold
hands, and stick together. ...
And then remember the Dick-and-Jane books and the first
word you learned-the biggest word of all-LOOK.
Everything you need to know is there somewhere. The
Golden Rule and love and basic sanitation. Ecology and
politics. ...
Think what a better world it would be if we all-the whole
world-had cookies and milk about three o'clock every after-
noon and then lay down with our blankies for a nap. Or if
all governments had as a basic policy to always put things
back where they found them and clean up their own mess.
And it is still true, no matter how old you are-when you go
out into the world, it is best to hold hands and stick together.
Hold hands and stick together. This is good advice for the young
and the old, but it is ignored in the real world by nations that place
self-interest above everything else. Unless that changes-which it
won't-the marginal influence of sanctions, embargoes, and other con-
straints will be more than offset by penalties imposed upon U.S. busi-
ness. It is, after all, politics before business.
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